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Nasser of Egypt and the Egypt of Nasser
In the Egyptian consciousness, there is a date that resonates in the nation’s memory as the
official catalyst that led to the rise of modern Egypt: July 23, 1952. On this day, a military group
called the Free Officers rose up and seized control of Egypt from the monarchs and British
colonizers in a near bloodless coup d’état. The face of the Free Officers at the time of the coup
was General Muhammad Naguib (1901 – 1984), but the brain and heart of the movement was the
then colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918 – 1970). During the first three years after the coup,
Naguib played his role of Egyptian President even though, it was clear to the public – Egyptian
and foreign – that Nasser was the one who truly held power. Nasser finally came into the
presidential title to match his presidential power when Naguib was removed from office in 1954
after being implicated as a conspirator of a failed assassination plot on Nasser. Shortly after
Nasser took office, he penned his historic work, The Philosophy of the Revolution (1955). The
book reads like a confessional of all that Nasser had done and all that he aspired to do in the
name of making Egypt as strong as he knew it could be. He saw the Egyptian nation shaking
away the yoke of western colonization and becoming a nation of strength and success. If Egypt
could rise to become the ideal Arab nation, free of colonial influence, all other Arab nations
would be moved to unite as well (as individual nations) and create a nationalistic pan-Arabism
future. In all, Nasser did successfully sow the seeds for the illustrious Arab future he saw. He
inspired Egyptians to work together to become a powerful nation and cultivated immense
support for the pan-Arabism movement amongst the multi-national Arab public. Unfortunately,
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there was to be no fruition of Nasser’s goals because the nationalist ideology was simply too
closely identified with Nasser’s image, rather than inherent within the government or a potential
successor. When Nasser died on September 28, 1970, the Egyptian revolution – and much of the
pan-Arabism revolution – died with him.
Nasser’s revolution, began long before his birth; beginning with the British colonization
of Egypt in 1884. Egypt had not been under self-governance for centuries and when the British
began colonization, it was the last straw on the camel’s back. Egypt under British colonial rule
was a poor time. Government officials put in place by the British crown put up facades of
Egyptian grandeur to the international audience. They tried to “Europeanize” the architecture,
engineering, and culture of Egypt while repressing the culture of the Egyptians.1 Underneath this
glaze of prosperity, poverty levels among the Egyptian population were abysmally high. There
were housing shortages, the nation’s infrastructure was not being maintained, and the fertile land
along Nile River was owned by a few rich men who, therefore wielded immense power in the
nation. The Egyptian public was extremely discontented with British government policy. When
the Free Officers rose to overthrow the monarchy in 1952, they rose with support from a huge
portion of Egyptians. In fact, the Free Officers came into power with the support of the Wafd
party and the Muslim Brotherhood, two radically different Egyptian political groups who found
unity in the fight for decolonization. Egyptians longed for a revolution, and according to Nasser,
they got three.
In The Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasser writes that every nation goes through two
internal revolutions – one political and one social – in order to become the ideal, modern version
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of itself. While every nation has or will go through two internal revolutions, Nasser believes that
the situation Egypt found itself in during 1952 was particularly unique
Every nation on earth undergoes two revolutions… Other nations have preceded us along
the path of human progress and passed through the two revolutions but not
simultaneously. In the case of our nation, it is going through the two revolutions together
and at the same time, a great experiment putting us to the test.2
Egypt was being forced to endure two internal revolutions at once because of colonial powers
stunting the natural growth of the nation.3 This same type of colonization that so negatively
affected Egypt, also affected the Middle Eastern region as a whole. The British or French crown
colonized the entire region, repressing the natural flourish of a collective Middle Eastern culture.
As a result, the revolutionary government of Egypt found itself having to manage two Egyptian
revolutions while, at the same time, navigating the effects of a third, multi-national social
revolution that affected all Arabs. Each revolution was interconnected in many ways and the
decisions of leaders throughout the world during key events wound up affecting all three
revolutions. Nasser balanced the three revolutions with copious amounts of propaganda, political
cunning, and high-levels of charisma.
A political revolution, Nasser wrote, was the process of recovering the “right of selfgovernment from an imposed despot, or an aggressive army occupying its territory without its
consent.”4 The act of organizing and pulling off the coup of 1952 was a successful and relatively
easy first step towards the political revolution Egypt needed to see. The next steps, were
significantly more difficult to execute as it required the engagement of the Egyptian people
2

Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (United States: Smith, Keynes & Marshall,
1959), 36
3
Saleh Omar, “Arab Nationalism: A Retrospective Evaluation” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 4
(1992): p. 23-37
4
Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, 36
3 | Jackson

within their government. Even before the British occupation, Egypt had been under the rule of
various foreign governments for nearly a century resulting in Egyptians who had become
subdued and politically subservient to foreign rule.5 In order for the political revolution in Egypt
– as the social revolution throughout the Arab nations – to succeed and be sustained, the
psychology of an entire nation had to be shifted to remake Egypt into a catalyst that would usher
in a new era.6
The agrarian reforms were Nasser’s first major step to initiate this nationwide
psychological reprogramming.7 The reform redistributed the fertile land along the Nile among
peasant class causing a complete overhaul of the old Egyptian economy. To give an Egyptian
man land was to give him the ability to support himself and his nation which, therefore, give him
dignity.8 Nasser delivered this dignity directly to the Egyptians by handing out land deeds in
person.9 Not only did the agrarian reform initiate a distinct shift in the Egyptian psychology and
bolstered public support of the revolution, but it also sharply reduced the political power that big
landowners had previously wielded in government. As an added bonus, the land left over from
after the redistribution gave the new government a source of rather convenient reliable income as
they could sell and rent out the excess land.10
The new government also received income and public support by nationalizing the Suez
Canal. An economic resource long exploited by the French and British, the Suez Canal was a
critical in shortening trade routes between Europe and the Far East. By nationalizing the canal,
Nasser essentially reclaimed the Egyptian economy from the hands of the British and French. It
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marked the end of British occupation in Egypt almost as significantly as the July revolution
itself. In the 1996 biopic film, Nasser 56, this importance of the nationalization of the canal is a
central theme.
The film opens on 18 June 1956 with Nasser taking down the Union Jack as British
troops prepare to evacuate the Suez Canal zone, ending their seventy-four-year
occupation. Primarily a political adventure, the film then traces the breakdown in
negotiations over the Western project to finance the Aswan High Dam; Nasser’s personal
decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company11
In the film, Nasser’s role in the Egyptian struggle for Suez is inflated to reflect the commonly
held public opinion of Nasser himself. The idea that it was Nasser who truly made the
reclamation of the Suez Canal Company happen – that it was not only his personal decision to
nationalize the canal, but that he was also powerful enough to execute the act on behalf of the
prosperity of the Egyptian people – was within the realm of cinematic believability for the
Egyptian public because, at the time, he was constantly being portrayed as the ultimate
figurehead for a prosperous Egyptian future.
These critical moves executed so early in the revolution made the government a friend to
the masses. Nasser’s tactical and constant propaganda resulted in the Egyptian public absolutely
adoring him.12 His powerful speeches broadcast throughout the nation and became the
inspiration for many. As a political figure, Nasser enjoyed a remarkable amount of popularity for
an even more remarkable amount of time. Nasser’s popularity was at its lowest after failing to
win the six day Arab-Israeli war, but even then, when Nasser offered his resignation from
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presidency, millions of Egyptians took to the streets in protest.13 The public viewed him as a
savior of the nation and refused to authorize his resignation for the loss. Losing the war did cost
Nasser his hero status, but it took little toll on the amount of loyalty he received from the
Egyptian people.
Despite the many supporters Nasser had, there were many enemies as well that Nasser
considered a natural consequence of any revolutionary thought. “I realize we have aroused the
wrath of old politicians; but was it possible not to do so and yet behold our country a victim to
their passions, their corruption, and their struggle for the spoils of office?”14 The enemies Nasser
made were not just local Egyptians who resented the end of the old regime, but other national
leaders as well. Because of Egypt’s role in the third Arab-wide social revolution, Nasser’s image
and propaganda, which held within it the fundamental philosophies of his Egyptian revolution,
was spread across the Arab world. Rulers in other Arab countries that operated under more
traditional rule became wary of this spread of ideas that was soon to become known as
Nasserism.15 Nasserism found its ways into other countries and began inciting other groups to act
against their respective governments. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria that
operated under those types of traditional governments that most likely would have shunned
Egypt entirely during this time if it had not been for two reasons.
The first reason was that the reinvigorated Egypt was becoming an economic
powerhouse, a crucial political player just as Nasser had wished.16 Having ties with the Egyptian
economy was superbly lucrative, and there was plenty of opportunity to do so as Nasser often
refused to deal with Western powers. The second reason these countries did not isolate Egypt
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was because they all were in agreement that they needed to work together to solve one issue that
was seen as an affront to the entire Arab world: the Israeli occupation of Palestine.
Throughout Nasser’s reign – in fact throughout his entire life – the tangled IsraeliPalestine struggle would be a pan-Arabism nationalist theme that he would be forced to address
as a political leader. The repercussions of the British forcing the Palestinians from their land by
way of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 was of constant international focus. Quite fortunately,
Nasser’s own passionate views of the struggle reflected that of many other Arabs.
I remember that the first elements of Arab consciousness began to filter into my mind as a
student in secondary schools, wherefrom I went out with my fellow schoolboys on strike
on December 2nd of ever year as a protest against the Balfour Declaration whereby
England gave the Jews a national home usurped unjustly from its legal owners.17
The Israeli nation had, in the eyes of Nasser and a large portion of Arabs, poached Palestinian
land with the support of the already stigmatized Western powers. As the excerpt suggests,
protests of the Balfour Declaration were frequent across almost all Arab nations and violence
occurred often between the two groups. Nasser believed, like most Arabs, that the Israelites had
to be removed from Palestine as a way to remove the residual stain of Western influence in
Middle East. But Nasser also saw the Palestinian-Israeli struggle as a direct by-product of a
social revolution that had been in play across all Arab nations since before his birth.
Every social revolution required discord according to Nasser “…in which the classes of
society would struggle against each other until justice for all countrymen has been gained and
conditions have become stable.”18 He saw the continuous discord between Arabs as a result of
social upheaval rather than a result of the few differences between each nation. While it was all
17
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necessary for social progression, this had prevented the Middle East from thriving, allowing
Western influence to remain.19 Nasser must have believed the acceptance of the pan-Arabism
movement was an indicator that the Arab revolution was, at the time, nearing its end.
By this point, the Arab Nation had become “unmistakably defined as embracing all the
Arabic-speaking people in Asia and Africa”20 and because of the massive successes Egypt had
seen thanks to the cunning of Nasser, it was commonly believed that his Egypt would be the
leader of this union, should it ever exist.21 Nasser, of course, had confidence that Egypt could be
the leader of the Arab world too22 and realized that a success in Palestine could be the catalyst
that would unite the nations.23 In order to pave the road to the success of the pan-Arabism social
revolution – and also pave the road for the closely intertwined Egyptian revolutions – Nasser
planned to groom Egypt to be the example pan-Arabism nation. He released propaganda that
glorified pan-Arabism and made a point to repeatedly include pan-Arabism ideology in the
Egyptian constitution of 1923.
We, the people of Egypt, realizing that we form an organic part of a greater Arab unity,
and aware of the responsibilities and obligations towards the common Arab struggle for
the glory and prestige of the Arab Nation…24
Nasser absorbed the pan-Arabism revolution to become an intrinsic part of his public identity
just as he had done with the other two revolutions. Nasser was just a man, but he became the
Egyptian and Arab revolutions personified. This was to be the ultimate cause of the failure of all
three revolutions.
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Nasser’s re-mortalization after the loss of six day war in June 1967 was a devastating
blow to the people’s faith in all revolutions.25 Not only was Nasser defeated, but he was defeated
at the hands of Israel, an indirect branch of the western civilization he stood so firmly against.
This was a devastating blow to the Egyptian people who had derived strength from their leader.
“President Sadat, years later, commented that Nasser did not die on 28 September 1970 but on 5
June 1967 (the day the war broke out)”26 If it had been only Nasser the hero who died, then the
revolutions might have been salvaged, but three years later, Nasser, the man, died as well. Gamal
Abdel Nasser died at the age of 52 on September 28, 1970 of a heart attack. This unceremonious
death was honored nationally by millions of Egyptians taking to the streets in mourning, but
there was no outlet for their grief. There was no single enemy to rally against. It was Nasser’s
own flesh and blood that had ultimately betrayed him.
Without Nasser’s direct influence, there was no longer any force driving the Egyptian and
Arab movements. Within three years Egypt reverted to dependency under the leadership of
President Anwar Sadat, who had no issues supporting western powers. Infrastructure fell back
into disrepair, the economy fell into a decline, and the revolutions ended.
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